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Economics. ABSTRACT
Environmental policies are characterized by a growing emphasis on participation, devolution and ne-
gotiated decision making. Increasingly, centralized top down decision making systems are being replaced
by new forms of local governance. In their strongest versions, these involve delegation of formal au-
thority to local stakeholders who are expected to decide collectively upon the management rules of local
common-pool resources. Devolution is particularly important in relation to the allocation and man-
agement of scarce water resources. Indeed the French water law of 1992 institutionalised the notion of
devolution by requiring that water management rules be negotiated at the river basin level between all
stakeholders. Although stakeholder negotiation is becoming increasingly important, relatively little is
understood about the inuence of the structure of negotiations on their outcomes. There is therefore a
rising demand for applied simulation models which can be used as 'negotiation-support tools' to address
such questions as: what criteria should determine participation rules ? What kind of biases result from
power asymmetries ? In this paper, we apply the Rausser-Simon (RS) framework to a specic negotiation
process, involving water use and storage capacity. The RS framework is a computable non cooperative
bargaining model designed to study complex real world multi-agent, multi-issue negotiation problems.
The elements of the modelled negotiation structure include: the list of participants at the bargaining
table; the set of issues being negotiated; the decision rule; political weights ("access"); and the nature of
the outcome if agreement cannot be reached (the fall-back option).
The application we consider focuses on the upper part of the Adour Basin in south-western France. In-
creased irrigation use in recent years has led to recurrent water shortages, resulting in increased tensions
among water users and potential damages to aquatic life. Public authorities have oered to nance new
water supply facilities provided that stakeholders can agree on management issues such as quota alloca-
tions, water prices and dam conguration. A number of issues arise concerning the relationship between
the structure of the negotiating process and the eectiveness with which participating stakeholders can
pursue their individual interests.
The case study is modelled with seven aggregate players (three aggregate farmers representing three
sub-basins - upstream, midstream and downstream - two environmental lobbies, the taxpayer and the
water manager), and with up to nine negotiated variables (water quotas and water prices in each sub-
basin, and the capacities of three dams). Farmers' utility functions are estimated using hydraulic data
and calibrated linear programming farm models. The richness of the data and institutional information
available to us provides a realistic environment in which to examine the eect of negotiation structure
on participant power.
We focus in particular on the three farmer stakeholder group, whose interests are aligned but distinct,
and so form a natural negotiating coalition. We construct experiments that enable us to evaluate the
eects of negotiation structure on the eectiveness of this coalition. Our comparative statics experiments
highlight a number of aspects of the relationship between negotiation structure and bargaining power. In
addition to the standard indices of bargaining power - the distribution of access and "default strength"
(i.e., stakeholders' relative tolerance for the outcome if negotiations break down) - our analysis identies
a number of other less obvious sources of power. A coalition member can advance his own interests by
ceding his own political access to another coalition member who has a "better" strategic location. It
is also shown that while the interests of the coalition as a whole will be advanced if its members cede
access to a "spokesman" representing their common interests, some coalition members may be adversely
aected. Finally, we consider the eect on the coalition of restricting the set of proposals that may
be placed on the bargaining table in order to mitigate "beggar thy neighbour" behaviour by coalition
members. This improves all farmers' utilities, except in some specic cases in which external constraints
initially oblige players to act as if they were playing cooperatively. In conclusion, the value of this model
is to be used by the negotiation stakeholders to explore the implications of alternative specications of
2the bargaining environment. In particular, the simulations reveal that the ways in which the negotiation
structure interact with stakeholder bargaining power are complex and lead to non intuitive outcomes.
31 INTRODUCTION
Many areas of public policy, in particular for natural resources management, are characterized by an
increasing emphasis on devolution, i.e., direct stake-holder participation in the policy formation process.
The trend toward devolution has been particularly signicant in the area of water policy, where conicts
are often very complex and sometimes outstrip the capabilities of even the best institutional arrange-
ments. It is increasingly acknowledged that new solutions must be found outside the established process
of centralized public decision-making. One of the responses has been to promote collective negotiated
decision-making procedures. Examples abound in the domain of water management, with the goal to de-
sign policies that are not only environmentally and economically sustainable, but also politically viable.
An analysis of one such collective negotiation among stakeholders, the so-called Three-Way Negotiations
which took place in the early 'nineties in California, has been analyzed in Adams, Rausser and Simon
(1996). Other, more recent examples include the San Francisco Estuary Project and the Sacramento
Water Forum . In France, the principle of negotiated rules has been institutionalized in the Water Law
promulgated in 1992. This law species that specic development plans be set up at the level of each
hydrological basin, and that water regulations be negotiated at the much smaller scale of catchment ar-
eas. It is required that regulations be negotiated locally between all stakeholders under the supervision
of local authorities .
Although stakeholder negotiation is becoming an increasingly important policymaking tool, relatively
little is understood about the interactions between the structure of the negotiating process and outcomes
of the negotiation (Thoyer et al, 2001). In this paper, we focus more specically on the nature of stake-
holder power within a collective negotiation, and how this power is inuenced by the structure of the
negotiation process and the interests of the participants. Understanding these relationships is important
for negotiation participants, and for policymakers designing such processes.
For our purposes, we dene bargaining power as the capacity of a stakeholder to inuence the negotiated
outcome in order to increase the utility he receives. In this paper, we are interested in the bargaining
power wielded by a subset of stakeholders, whose interests are suciently aligned that they may be
thought of as a loose coalition. In our case study, the coalition consists of farmers representing dierent
sub-basins of a given river basin. While these farmers compete with each other for water, their interests
are more closely aligned with each other's than with the other stakeholders at the table, including in
particular those representing environmental and non-agricultural uses of water. We analyze three ques-
tions related to the bargaining power of our coalition. First, what are the sources of bargaining power,
and how do they interact? Second, is it ever advantageous for some or all of the coalition members to
delegate their bargaining position to a "spokesman" representing their joint interests? Third, how does
the denition of the bargaining space-i.e., the vector of variables over which negotiations take place, and
the restrictions imposed on these variables- aect the bargaining power and resulting utilities of partici-
pants? In particular, in some of the bargaining spaces we consider, individual farmers are permitted to
pursue their own interests at the expense of the interests of the coalition as a whole, by allocating more
water to their own sub-basins at lower prices than other farmers pay. Do coalition members benet when
restrictions are imposed on the degree to which they can distinguish their own interests from those of
other farmers?
Understanding the factors determining the answers to such questions will facilitate the design of ne-
gotiation processes that represent the interests of all stakeholders in an implementable and sustainable
fashion. At an intuitive level, stakeholders' power in the negotiation process is measured by their "access"
to the decision-making process. Access is a catch-all term for many considerations, including the number
of representatives included in the process, the capacity to set agendas, placement on key committees,
etc. However, we show that other, more subtle, kinds of power can swamp the simple eects of access.
In order for a negotiation process to fairly include all interests, the interactions among negotiation struc-
ture and stakeholder preferences that create bargaining power must be taken into consideration when
policymakers design a negotiation process.
In order to address these questions, we model a specic negotiation process, regarding the use and
4storage of water in the three sub-basins of the upper Adour Basin in south-western France. For our
purposes, this process has a number of advantages as a research topic. First, the negotiation process, de-
signed by the national government, has a relatively transparent set of rules determining participants and
a relatively well-dened outcome in the event that the parties are unable to negotiate a solution. Second,
our modeling task is facilitated because the underlying hydrology of the river basin is well-documented
and because a great deal of information is available regarding the agricultural use of water, in terms
of both quantities used and the value of the resulting production. Third, two types of environmental
goals are recognized explicitly by participants: the value of residual ows, which promote aquatic life,
and the scenic costs of dams, which destroy attractive valley landscapes. These two goals both compete
with each other and with farmers' use of water for production purposes. Finally, the natural division of
farmers by sub-basin provides us with a subset of "natural allies," or coalition. The quality of the data
and institutional information provides us with a rich and realistic environment for examining the eect
of process structure on participant power. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the
Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining model, which provides the theoretical basis for this application.
Section 3 introduces the Adour Basin, explains the nature of the negotiations that are underway and
presents our formal specication of the bargaining problem. Section 4 contains our comparative statics
analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 THE UNDERLYING BARGAINING GAME
The analytical framework for this paper is a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining model developed
in Rausser and Simon (1999) and applied in Adams et al. (1996). In this section, we review the main
features of the model. In contrast to the vast theoretical literature on bilateral bargaining spawned by
the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982), the Rausser-Simon framework is designed to analyze complex
multi-issue, multiplayer bargaining problems. It has no closed form solution, and so must be solved using
computational techniques.
The specication of a multilateral bargaining problem includes a nite set of players, denoted by
I = f1;;Ig and indexed by i. The players meet together to select a policy vector from some set
X of possible alternatives. X is assumed to be a compact subset of n-dimensional Euclidean space,
where n is the cardinality of the vector of issues being negotiated. The policy vector ~ x yields player i a
utility of ui(~ x). We denote by ~ u0 the vector of disagreement payos, i.e., the payos players receive if
they fail to negotiate an agreement. Throughout this paper, we will assume that decisions are reached
by unanimity, i.e., an element of X can be selected as the solution to the bargaining problem only if it
is accepted by all parties at the bargaining table.
A bargaining game is derived from a bargaining problem by superimposing upon it a negotiation process.
A bargaining game is formulated with a nite number, T, of bargaining rounds. Once we have explained
how to solve the nite-round game, we will dene the solution to the limit bargaining game to be the
limit of the (unique) subgame-perfect equilibria of the nite-round games. At the beginning of the t'th
round (t < T) of the nite game, provided that the game has not already concluded by this round, na-
ture chooses at random some player to be the proposer for this round; nature's choice is governed by an
exogenously probability distribution, ~ w = (wi)i2I, where wi 2 [0;1], player i is chosen with probability
wi; and
P
i wi = 1. The vector ~ w is interpreted as a distribution of access to the political system, and
wi is referred to as player i's access probability;
The player selected by nature then makes a proposal, which is a policy vector in X . All the other
players vote on whether or not to accept the proposal on the table. The game concludes in this round
if and only if all players vote to accept the proposal; if some player votes against the proposal, play
proceeds to the next round. If the T'th round of the game is reached, and if the proposal in this round
is rejected, then players receive the vector of disagreement payos ~ u0. We assume throughout that the
5set X contains a proposal that strictly Pareto dominates ~ u0.
There is a simple characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies for a game with T rounds
of bargaining: a proposal made by player i in period T is accepted if and only if it yields each player
j a utility level at least as great as the player's disagreement utility . In each round t < T, a proposal
by i is accepted if and only if it yields each j a utility level at least as great as j's expected utility from
playing the subgame starting from round t + 1 . Clearly the game can be solved recursively, starting
from the last round: in each round t, player i computes the policy vector that maximizes i's utility,
subject to the constraint that for each j, the vector yields player j no less than its default utility if
t = T, or its expected utility conditional on reaching the next round if t < T (also called j's reservation
utility). If the solution to i's constrained maximization problem yields i at least i's expected utility from
proceeding to the next round, then i proposes the vector; otherwise i proposes a vector that will be re-
jected, and thus passes on to the next round 1 . An elementary example is provided in Adams et al (1996).
3 ADOUR RIVER NEGOTIATIONS
We calibrate the Rausser-Simon bargaining model to a specic case study, the negotiation over the
Adour river catchment: our analysis is based on extensive work regarding the hydrology, agriculture
and political economy of the upstream part of the Adour river basin in southwestern France, from its
origin in the Pyrenees to its junction with the Midouze river (Faysse, 1997; Faysse and Morardet, 1999;
Cemagref, 1994; Gleyses and Morardet, 1997).
3.1 Background
Over the past twenty years, the use of river water for irrigation has increased substantially in the Adour
basin, and now is its most important use by volume. Most of the agricultural use occurs in the dry
summer months of July and August, when the river ow is also low. Increased irrigation has led to a
water decit in the basin equal to roughly a fth of annual agricultural use. Environmental groups and
downstream users have expressed growing concern due to the reduction in river ows. One solution to
the water decit would be the construction of up to three dams located at specic points on the river:
these dams would capture water during the winter months in order to release the water in summer. This
proposal has attracted opposition from other environmental groups, who are concerned about the eects
of dams on the natural landscape (see Figure 1).
Under the national French water law passed in 1992, water is proclaimed a national common heritage,
and stakeholders are assigned responsibility for designing the regulations governing its use. Management
of water resources is expected to reconcile water user needs and environmental uses of water. Specic
water development plans were developed for each hydrological basin , and regulations to implement these
plans must be developed and enforced at the catchment level, through negotiated decision-making among
all stakeholders under conditions dened by the relevant government authorities. The Adour basin is an
example of such a catchment area .
1Rauuser and Simon (1991) demonstrate that if X is compact and each player's utility is strictly quasi-concave
on X, then every nite game has a unique solution vector, consisting of a point in X for each player, which will
be proposed by that player if he is chosen in the rst round to be the proposer. Moreover, with probability one,
players in round one accept whichever proposal is made. Now consider a sequence of nite-round bargaining
games, which are all identical except that the number of bargaining periods increases without bound. It can be
shown that any sequence of solution vectors for these games has a limit in X, and that limit is deterministic, i.e.,
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Figure 1: A schematic of the Adour Basin
In the Adour case, stakeholders were charged with determining the size of dams, the amount of water
that should be allocated to irrigation, how this water should be allocated among agricultural users, and
the price that users should pay for this water. The negotiating group included elected representatives of
agricultural producers; a group representing the interests of urban and industrial consumers downstream
from our study area, environmental interests and the manager of the semi-public Adour Basin water
authority that maintains infrastructure, delivers water, and monitors river ow.
3.2 Structure of the negotiation
The Adour Basin consists of three sub-basins. We will label these by U, M and D, for upstream,
midstream and downstream. Farmers in each sub-basin are negotiating over the quota allocation they
will receive. The negotiated quota allocation determines the maximum cubic meters a farmer is entitled
to use per eligible hectare farmed.
Farmers are required to pay a xed unit price for each quota unit at the time it is allocated. Revenue
from quota sales accrues to the water manager, to oset his operating costs . A budget constraint (the
water manager's operating costs must be covered) relates the level of quota sales to the minimum level
of prices that can be charged for quotas. Operating costs have been estimated to be an ane function
of aggregate dam capacity. Operating revenues are the inner product of after-tax quota prices and the
water allocation.
Quota sales are limited by hydrology constraints, described below, which depend in part on the nat-
ural ows of water through the three sub-basins. There are proposals on the table to supplement these
natural ows by building as many as three dams. Although there is a maximum capacity level for
each dam, determined by technological considerations, the actual size of the dams, however, is to be
negotiated. The dams, if constructed, will have dierent implications for water ows in the sub-basins:
dam 2 will increase ows to sub-basin D only, while dams 1 and 3 increase ows to all three sub-basins.
Dam construction is to be nanced by general taxation. That is, farmers will be required to nance the
operating cost, but not the capital cost, of the dams. Dam construction is controversial: on the plus
side, new dams would increase the residual ow of water through the sub-basins, beneting users who
are downstream of the sub-basins, promoting aquatic life, and relaxing the hydrological constraints on
farmers; on the minus side, dams are costly and degrade the quality of the rural landscape.
For each sub-basin, the residual ow of water cannot fall short of a minimum level (called objective
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ow), which was set in the Adour-Garonne Water Development Plan in order to protect aquatic life in
the river. The residual ow in each sub-basin is calculated as the dierence between the total volume
of water that ows into the sub-basin, including releases from existing and proposed new dams, and the
total volume of water used by farmers within that sub-basin. Two of the three classes of variables being
negotiated will aect directly the hydrology constraints: dam capacities, which aect water inows, and
quotas, which determine water outows. In most years (eight out of ten), rainfall is sucient that none
of the hydrology constraints would bind even if no dams were constructed. We will henceforth refer
to this state of aairs as normal conditions. In the remaining years, referred to as drought conditions,
water is suciently scarce that the up- and mid-stream hydrology constraints will be binding unless dam
capacities are suciently increased.
3.3 The bargaining space
There are three classes of continuous negotiated variables: prices, quotas and dam capacities. There are
three prices and three quotas, one pair for each sub-basin, and three proposed dams for which capacity
has to be decided upon. In the bargaining games we simulate, we distinguish between three regimes,
identied as CPCQ, CPIQ and IPCQ. Each regime is examined under both normal and drought condi-
tions. In regime CPCQ (common prices, common quotas) the bargaining space is restricted so that a
common price and a common quota applies to all sub-basins. In regime CPIQ (common prices, individual
quotas), the price remains common but bargainers are allowed to specify distinct quota levels for each
sub-basin. In regime IPCQ (for individual prices, common quotas), prices are common and quotas are
distinct .
Our motivation for considering these dierent regimes is two-fold: First, our objective is to consider
the eect of dierent institutional specications of the bargaining space on bargaining performance, and
these are three natural polar possibilities. Second, we would expect that if farmers are "forced" by
institutional necessity to adopt common positions during the negotiating process, rather than pursuing
their own private goals at the expense of farmers as a group, then their performance as a group would
be higher. The comparison of the three specied regimes allows us to test this conjecture.
3.4 Bargaining Participants
There are seven players. The utility of the three farmers were assessed through calibrated farm models.
For the other agents, the functional forms of their utility functions and their parameters were chosen on
an ad hoc basis to reect in a qualitative way the relative importance that the agents assign to dierent
concerns.
(1) three farmers, each one an aggregation of all the farmers in a given sub-basin. Farmers are
identied by their sub-basins, i.e., Fu, Fm and Fd. Each farmer's objective is to maximize his utility
from production. To evaluate their prot function, we modeled farmers' behavior with mathematical
programming techniques. The objective was to generate a set of data on prots, quotas and prices in
order to nally estimate the parameters of the prot function through econometric techniques. Each
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with pi, the quota price facing the i'th farmer and qi, the i'th component of the water allocation vector.
Higher quotas increase utility, given the quota price, and lower quota prices increase utility, given the
quota level. While dam capacities are not explicit arguments of farmers' utility functions, they do, how-
ever, aect farmers' utilities through the model constraints. Farmers are distinguished from each other
by their willingness to pay for quotas. For a given water quota, farmer Fm has the highest willingness
to pay. Farmer Fu has the second highest willingness to pay, and farmer Fd has the lowest willingness
to pay. The farmers also vary in the number of hectares cultivated. Fu is substantially larger than the
other two.
(2) an environmentalist (Ev), representing a weighted combination of diverse environmental interests
and recreational users. This party is primarily concerned about damage to the rural landscape from dam
construction, and secondarily about maintaining adequate river ow rates. It has a CES utility function
that is decreasing in DCk the capacity of the k'th dam, expressed as a fraction of its maximum capacity











where x(k) = [(RFu + RFm) ;RFd ;(2   DC1   DC2) ;(1   DC3) ]
(3) a downstream user (Ds) representing all stakeholders in the Adour basin that are downstream
of all three of the sub-basins that we study. These users are primarily concerned with minimizing up-
stream demands on water ows and secondarily concerned with preserving the rural landscape. The
form of these players' utilities is the same as the environmentalists' but the weights dier sharply: the
environmentalist assigns a much greater weight to the terms involving dam capacity (the DC's); the
downstream user weights the terms involving residual ows (the RF's) much more heavily.
Note that both ows in sub-basins U and M, and the capacities of dams 1 and 2, are perfect substi-
tutes for one another, and imperfect substitutes for the remaining variable. The reason is that dam 3
is considered to have a particularly signicant impact on the landscape, because it is in the mountains
in a particularly scenic valley, while residual ow in basin D is considered particularly important for
maintaining aquatic life and recreational activities.
(4) the manager (Mg), who administers the distribution of water in the district. For statutory reasons,
the manager is equally concerned to avoid budget imbalance (positive or negative). Further, he derives
utility from increasing the scope of the water system he administers. That is, he prefers a larger operation,










where x(1) = (3 DF1 DF2 DF3) and x(2) is a measure of the positive or negative budget imbalance.
(5)the taxpayer (Tp): taxpayers in our model are represented by a local politician, whose primary
objective is to save his constituents' money, hence he disapproves of dams. The taxpayer shares the
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ows. His utility is CES in three arguments, the rst two
are the same as the rst two variables for the downstream user and the environmentalist; the third term










where x(1) = RFu + RFm , x(2) = RFd and x(3) = 3  
P
i Ci with Ci is the construction cost of the
i'th dam, expressed as a fraction of the cost of constructing the most expensive version of this dam.
The preference prole described above gives rise to a clear-cut conict between farmers on the one hand,
and the taxpayer and the environmentalist on the other. Farmers prefer higher quotas, and, when the hy-
drology constraints are binding, prefer greater dam capacity to less. The taxpayer and environmentalist
prefer lower quotas, because quotas and residual ows are inversely related, and less dam capacity, either
to lower the tax burden or preserve the rural landscape. The relationship between the manager and the
downstream user to these opposing camps is less clear-cut. Like the farmers, the manager prefers higher
quotas and more dam capacity, but, in contrast to the farmers, he also prefers higher prices. Like the
taxpayer and the environmentalist, the downstream user prefers lower quotas because he values higher
residual ows; in contrast to those parties, however, the downstream user prefers more dam capacity,
because his primary concern about residual ows dominates his secondary concern about the landscape.
4 COMPARATIVE STATISTICS ANALYSIS
In this section, we apply our model of the Adour River negotiations to a number of questions regarding
bar- gaining power. In subsection 4.1 we introduce our method of analysis with a stripped down model in
which only three players participate. In subsection 4.2 we investigate whether farmers benet more when
they participate independently in the bargaining process, or when they are represented by a common
spokesman, charges with maximizing the joint interests of all farmers. Finally, in subsection 4.3, we con-
sider how the denition of the bargaining space aects player utilities. In particular, we examine whether
farmers' bargaining power is increased if the maximum permissible degree of heterogeneity across water
prices or quotas is restricted.
In our model, it is important to emphasise that there is no such thing as a farmer coalition. Each
farmer faces two forms of opposition. One is the opposition from non farmers who, on the whole, have
opposite interests to him. Non farmers want high residual ows, therefore low aggregate quotas - no
matter how the restriction on quotas is distributed among farmers - and they prefer high prices to o-
set investment costs - no matter which farmer pays. In that sense, farmers form an informal coalition
because they face the same opponents. The other opposition comes from internal competition to share
the burden imposed by others, each farmer wanting his fellow farmers to support a larger share. In this
internal competitive game, they are not equal:
 in terms of relative preferences for quotas and prices (because Fm has the greatest willingness to
pay for quotas).
 in terms of potential contribution to budget constraint: since Fu has the largest irrigated area, a
unit increase in Fu's price or quota raises more revenue than a unit increase in either one of the
two other farmers' prices or quotas.
 in terms of location in the river basin: a decrease in Fu's quota will benet the two downstream
basins, therefore contributing to satisfy the three hydrological constraints, whereas any decrease
10of the quotas allocated to the downstream farmers will only contribute to the downstream hydro-
logical constraint.
4.1 Shifting Access: a simple example
To introduce our method of analysis, we begin with a stripped down model in which all but three of the
players specied above are excluded from the bargaining process. The players that remain are Fu, Fm
and Ds. The comparative statics experiment we consider is a shift in access from farmer Fu to farmer
Fm. For this example, we restrict our analysis to the CPCQ regime, and assume that in the nal round
of bargaining, Ds's participation constraint is binding on both of the other players. It is said that Ds is
default strong.
The example illustrates, in a much simplied context, how we analyze the comparative statics prop-
erties of our model. In particular, the example illustrates the nature of the inductive arguments we use,
and demonstrates how eects in the last rounds of the game build on each other and become magnied
as we move backwards through the inductive chain.
Specically, one would expect that a reallocation of access from Fu to Fm would increase Fm's utility
while decreasing Fu's. In fact, the outcome is that both Fm and Fu benet from the shift. That is, Fu
actually benets by ceding power to a fellow farmer. Ds is worse o. The key to the argument is the
strategic role that farmer Fm's plays in the bargaining. By augmenting Fm's power, even at the expense
of his own, Fu can increase the eectiveness with which Fm plays this role. Because Fu's preferences are
partially aligned with Fm's, Fu gains an indirect benet as a result, which more than osets the direct
loss resulting from the reduction in his own power.
Fm's strategic role derives from the fact that Fm's is the unique participation constraint that is binding
on Ds in the penultimate round of bargaining . Each cluster of bars in Figure 2 decomposes the change
in the indicated player's expected utility in the indicated round, as access is shifted from Fu to Fm.
Consider, for example, of the left-most cluster in the top-right panel. The rst three bars represent
changes in Fu's utility from, respectively, Fu's, Fm's, and Ds's proposals. The fourth bar represents the
eect of the change of access, equal to the increase in Fm's access times the dierence between Fu's
utility from Fm's vs Fu's own proposal. The fth bar represents the change in total eect, i.e., the eect
of the access shift on Fu's expected utility conditional on reaching round T   2.
Since Fm strictly prefers his own proposal to the one made by Fu, the eect of the access shift in
the nal round of bargaining is to increase Fm's conditional on reaching this round, while decreasing
Fu's. The impact of the shift on Ds in this round is negligible. We now trace the impact of this initial
change as we move backwards up the inductive chain, with the help of the four panels of Figure 2.
Consider rst the penultimate round, represented graphically in the top left panel. As we have just
discussed, Fm's participation constraint is binding on Ds in the penultimate round. As Fm's access
increases, his constraint tightens and Ds's utility from his own proposal declines, while Fm's and Fu's
both increase. (These changes correspond to the positive bars in the middle of Fu's and Fm's clusters,
and the negative bar in the corresponding place for Ds.) As in the nal round, the access shift benets
Fm while hurting Fu, leaving Ds essentially unaected. The net eect on Fu of the two changes is
positive, as indicated by the positive right-most bar in Fu's cluster. For Fm, both eects of the access
shift reinforce each other, while for Ds, the only signicant consideration is the loss from his own proposal.
We now move to the top-right panel of Figure 2, which describes what happens in round T   2. All the
factors that applied in round T   1 apply in this round also, but they are reinforced by the fact that
Ds's participation constraint in this round becomes slacker as Fm's access increases. The main dierence
between this and the penultimate round is that both farmers in this round gain when either makes a





































































Figure 2: Fu gains by ceding access to Fm
on Ds accumulates. Matters get worse and worse for Ds in rounds T   3 and T   4, and conversely,
better and better for the two farmers. By the time round T   4 has been reached, all three players
are announcing essentially the same proposal, so that the changes depicted in the bottom-right panel
represent the comparative statics of the solution to the game.
To summarize the argument, when access is transferred from Fu to Fm, Fm's participation constraint
tightens and, since this constraint is binding on Ds, Ds is weakened. Since Ds's constraint is binding on
farmers, they each benet as a result, both because Ds's proposals are less onerous and because their
own proposals are less constrained. For farmer Fu these indirect gains dominate Fu s direct loss due to
the reduction in his access probability.
This simple example illustrates three characteristics of the model:
1. the snowball eect of the bargaining eects in the last rounds. In the following text, it will allow
us to examine only the last few rounds to explain the outcome of our simulations. ;
122. the strategic importance of the default-strength of each player: when the participation constraint
of a player in the last round is binding on other players, this player benets from a bargaining
comparative advantage which will tend to be reinforced round after round. It is important to
underline that this default strengthis directly related to the utility that the player derives from the
fall-back option, that is from the policy which will be implemented if no agreement is reached. It
can be assumed that the fall-back option is the status quo solution but the state can also threat
participants to impose a centralized solution which will yield dierentiated advantages to players.
Default strength is therefore embedded in the structure of the negotiation and can be oriented by
exogenous actors.
3. the non intuitive eect of sources of power interactions: this example highlights a striking char-
acteristic of the model, which distinguishes it from reduced-form models of bargaining such as
the Nash Bargaining model, and closely related models of policy formation such as the "political
preference function" approach. In all these models, there is a monotone relationship between a
player's exogenously specied indices of bargaining power-e.g., default strength and bargaining
weights-and the utility the player derives from the bargaining outcome. In our model, there are
other, less straightforward, sources of bargaining strength: we demonstrate here that a member
of a bargaining coalition can actually benet by ceding his bargaining power, as dened in the
conventional way, to another, strategically located coalition member, who can use that power more
eectively, to the benet of all coalition members.
4.2 Combining forces: impact of a common spokesman for farmers
In our second experiment, we consider the eect on farmers' performance of introducing a farmer
spokesman. Our spokesman is modelled as a slightly dierent kind of player from the others: he is
selected at each round to make a proposal with a given access probability ; but he does not have a par-
ticipation constraint (his approval is not required in order for a proposal to be accepted) and the notion
of default strength does not apply to him. The spokesman is similar to an attorney hired to represent
the interests of his clients: ultimately, the client themselves, not the attorney, must decide whether or
not to accept any proposed deal.
The spokesman's utility function is dened as the simple average of the three farmers' utility functions.
In this experiment, we consider the eect of increasing the spokesman's access. The access vector for
non-farmer parties is held constant throughout, and farmers' access probabilities are reduced by equal
amounts to accommodate the spokesman's increased access.
The goal of this experiment is to explore the natural conjecture that farmers will be able to negoti-
ate more eectively as a group, the more they can present a "united front" at the bargaining table.
When each farmer's proposal is weighted according to his access probabilities, farmers will tend to suf-
fer, on average, from the fact that other farmers fail to take account of their interests. The spokesman,
on the other hand, will internalise any externalities that exist between farmers, but are unexploited by
them when they negotiate individually. We would expect, therefore, that in the solution to the bargain-
ing game the mean of farmers' payos will, typically, increase with the spokesman's access. A number
of questions arise in the context of our particular model: Does the spokesman always improve farm-
ers performance ? Under what conditions will the spokesman's contributions have the greatest impact
? Which farmers benet from the spokesman's participation and which, if any, lose? What is the pre-
cise nature of the externalities that are ignored by individual farmers and internalised by the spokesman ?
To address these questions, we considered the role of the spokesman for a range of circumstances, vary-
ing both the issue space (regime) and level of environmental requirements . The eects of increasing
the spokesman's access on farmers' solution payos are summarized in Figure 3 for all combinations of
regimes and hydrological conditions. The horizontal axis plots the spokesman's access probability; the
vertical axis plots players' utilities, relative to their mean utilities across all iterations of the experiment.
The highlights of these four graphs are: (i) the mid-stream and downstream farmers always benet from
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Figure 3: Comparison of normalized payos as spokesman's access increases by regime and
hydrological conditions
the spokesman's involvement; (ii) in all cases except the normal conditions IPCQ regime, farmer Fu be-
comes worse o as the spokesman gains access; (iii) relative to his eect in other regimes, the spokesman
has an imperceptible eect on farmers' utilities in regime CPCQ.
It has to be emphasised that, due to the snowball eect presented in section 4.1, the explanations for
the eects observed can be tracked back by studying the dierences between the spokesman's proposal
and the average of farmers' individual proposals in the nal round of bargaining.
 Why does the spokesman always arbitrate against Fu, except in the normal conditions
IPCQ regime?
In IPCQ and CPIQ regimes, farmers have ample opportunity to pursue their own interests at the expense
of other farmers. Specically, in IPCQ (resp. CPIQ) each farmer assigns high prices (resp. low quotas)
to other farmers, and a low price (resp. high quota) to himself. This behavior is demonstrated, for the
14IPCQ drought conditions, in the top panel of Figure 4. The Figure 4 depicts information about the
proposals made by each of the three farmers, about the spokesman's proposal and about the average
of the three farmers' proposals. From left to right, the cluster of seven bars for each player represents:
the common quota; three individual price levels; the average of individual price proposals; the average
of Dam Capacities for dams 1 and 2; the capacity of dam 3; the average of up- and mid-stream residual
ows; downstream residual ows . In the lower panels of the gure, we display the dierence between
the spokesman's proposal and the average of the three farmer's proposals.














































































































Figure 4: Farmer proposals: regime IPCQ, drought conditions, nal round
When the budgetary constraint is limiting (or when the participation constraint of a player who cares
about budget balance, ie the taxpayer or the manager, is limiting on farmers), then the spokesman will
have to arbitrate between the three farmers to meet the constraint. It is the case in the IPCQ regime
for strict environmental standards. The least costly option in terms of the spokesman utility is therefore
to increase the price charged to farmer U. The spokesman exploits Fu's comparative advantage in gen-
erating revenue by proposing an asymmetric distribution of prices, and is able to cover the manager's
budget constraint at signicantly lower prices. Rather than taking the entire eciency benet in the
form of price reductions, the spokesman chooses to "purchase" a slight increase in quota levels. Farmers
Fm and Fd clearly prefer the spokesman's proposal to the average of their own proposals. In situation
of strict environmental standards, the increase in quota is insucient to compensate farmer U for the
price increase, and farmer U is worse o.
When the hydraulic constraints are binding (or when the participation constraint of a player who cares
about residual ows - the downstream user, the tax payer, the environmentalist - is limiting), the
spokesman will choose to reduce the quota attributed to farmer Fu. A quota is more costly in an
environmental sense when assigned to Fu than it is when assigned to Fm or Fd, because the former
reduces the water availability in all three sub-basins while the latter aects only the mid-stream and
downstream basins. This is the case in the CPIQ regimes (normal and drought conditions). These points
are illustrated in gure 5, for the CPIQ normal regime.






































































































Figure 5: Farmer proposals: regime CPIQ, normal conditions, nal round
 Why does Fu gain when spokesman's access increases in IPCQ normal regime ?
In the normal condition IPCQ regime, the budgetary constraint is not binding in the last round on either
individual farmers or the spokesman. Therefore the spokesman will assign prices to farmers according to
their relative preference for quotas and prices. Since the midstream farmer has the highest willingness
to pay for quota, he is attributed the highest price (see Figure 6).
However, it has to be emphasised that the farmers propose a signicantly higher vector of per-unit
price than the spokesman's proposal, in exchange for a very small increase in the common quota. This
asymmetry in price proposals is due to the downstream player Ds whose constraint is binding. Ds has
a second order preference for higher prices and is willing to "trade" additional quotas for higher prices,
though on extremely unfavourable terms for farmers. Farmers on the other hand are willing to assign
very high prices to their fellow farmers in exchange for gains that they would not consider worth the
cost if they had to pay it themselves. It is an extreme example of the "beggar thy neighbour" behaviour.
When the spokesman selects a proposal, by contrast, he fully takes into account the disutility that all
farmers incur from higher prices , and so refrains from pushing quotas beyond the level that farmers
would be individually willing to pay for.
In such context, the spokesman proposes a vector of prices which is much lower than the average pro-
posal of the three farmers. He reduces very slightly dam capacities with an insignicant reduction of the
common quota, which leaves the three farmers better o. The spokesman's eect is therefore to mitigate
negative cross-externalities among farmers.
 Why is the eect of the spokesman in CPCQ regime insignicant ?







































































































Figure 6: Farmer proposals: regime IPCQ, normal conditions, nal round
In regime CPCQ, the opportunities for self-promotion at the expense of the group are not available
to farmers. Under drought conditions, all farmers, including the spokesman, are forced by hydrology
constraints to make identical proposals. Clearly in this context, the spokesman cannot play any role at
all. In normal conditions, however, there is still room for farmers to dier between themselves, since
each farmer has a dierent willingness to pay for the marginal quota: Fm proposes the highest quotas,
prices and dam capacity levels, and Fd the lowest. When the spokesman's access increases, each farmer
does slightly better because the probability that a "detrimental" proposal of another farmer be selected
is reduced. Since each farmer's utility from the spokesman proposal exceeds his expected utility from all
farmers' proposals, his risk exposure is reduced.
In conclusion
This experiment reveals that in negotiations where there is scope for beggar thy neighbor behavior (i.e.
regimes IPCQ and CPIQ), the intervention of a spokesman will benet the farmers as a group. However,
this global benet is obtainable only because the spokesman can discriminate against one of the farmers,
the farmer who can contribute to relax the limiting constraint at least costs in terms of eciency loss. As
we have observed, farmer Fu is the target of discrimination in both regimes: in IPCQ, a unit increase in
Fu's price raises more revenue than a unit increase in either one of the other farmers' prices; in CPIQ, a
unit increase in Fu's quota requires a larger increase in dam capacity than a unit increase in either one of
the other farmers' quotas. Hence the spokesman, whose task is to maximize the sum of farmers' utilities,
assigns a higher price and lower quota to Fu. We would expect, therefore, that in such situations, Fu
would not agree to the appointment of a spokesman of the kind we model. On the other hand, since the
farmer group does better on average with the spokesman, Fu could in principle be suciently compen-
sated with side-payments that all coalition members would benet from the spokesman's participation.
However, it should be warned that the spokesman, by pursuing the interests of the group as a whole, may
act in a way that is detrimental to the interests of one member of the group, and therefore reduces the
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Figure 7: Comparison of normalized payos: heterogeneity experiment
his participation constraint is binding when members of the opposition make proposals), the spokesman,
by weakening the key member's position, may ultimately weaken the group as a whole.
4.3 Reducing the Degree of Proposal Heterogeneity
In this experiment, we try to accomplish a similar role to the one that the spokesman accomplished, by
reducing the degree of permissible heterogeneity among player proposals, in IPCQ and CPIQ regimes.
We conduct comparative statics by progressively moving from an individualized regime (IPCQ or CPIQ)
to the common regime (CPCQ). Technically, in regime CPIQ (respectively IPCQ), the specication of
the bargaining space includes an upper bound on the standard deviation of the three quotas (resp. three
prices) proposed by any player. In the current comparative statics experiment, we consider the eect of
six successive reductions of this bound, each time by one percentage point of the original bound. The
progressive move from individualized to common regime limits the incentive for farmers to compete with
each other and forces them to adopt a common position.
18Intuitively we would expect that any situation in which farmers are required to set their proposals into
line should lead to higher individual farmer outcomes since the "beggar-thy-neighbor" behavior will be
increasingly proscribed . The eects of limiting proposal heterogeneity on farmers' solution payos is
illustrated in Figure 7 for the case in which Ds is default strong . The graphs reveal some interesting
dierences from the preceding experiment. The two most striking of these are: (i) in all cases, Fu does
better as heterogeneity is restricted (whereas he usually did worse as the spokesman's access increased);
(ii) in regime CPIQ under drought conditions, all farmers except Fu do worse as heterogeneity is re-
stricted;
 Why do farmers better in all situation (except for Fm and Fd in CPIQ drought)?
As in the preceding subsection, we will focus our attention on the nal round of bargaining. In the
IPCQ regime, the eect of the heterogeneity restriction is that the average price assigned to farmers Fu
declines sharply. The picture is less clear for farmers Fm and Fd: in the normal conditions, they are also
assigned a slightly lower average price (with a slightly higher quota); and in drought conditions, they
get a higher average price, compensated by a large quota.
When he has to satisfy the decrease in heterogeneity, each farmer must either lower other farmers' prices,
increase his own, or do both. Due to a tight budget constraint, each farmer is obliged to raise his own
price while lowering the prices charged to others. To compensate, he will bid for a higher common quota
and therefore for slightly higher dam capacities (up to the point where the marginal cost of increasing
dam capacity exceeds the marginal benet of higher quotas). The result is that each farmer's average
utility from the three farmer proposals increases as heterogeneity is limited since each farmer does worse
under his own proposal, but gains from other farmers proposals (which therefore increases his reservation
utility in the following round). He has therefore to pay for a higher share of the costs but this constrained
altruism leads to more collective eciency. On average, all farmers benet as the constraint tightens,
even though Fd's and Fu's prices rise in the drought situation.
In the CPIQ normal conditions regime (pictured in Figure 8), each farmer's quota proposal increases
on average as the constraint tightens. What happens here is very similar to what happens in the IPCQ
regime: as the constraint tightens, farmers must reduce the gap between the quotas they assign to them-
selves and those that they assign to other farmers. So they lower their own assignments and raise the
others. Once again, farmers do worse under their own proposals, but better when other farmers propose:
farmers are thus obliged by the tightening constraint to provide externalities to the others.
 Why all farmers except Fu do worse as heterogeneity is restricted in regime CPIQ
under drought conditions?
In regime CPIQ under drought conditions, farmers' utilities on average actually decline as the hetero-
geneity constraint tightens. (Fu's increases, but Fm's and Fd's decline). This property distinguishes
the present scenario from all the others we have considered: in the others, the "unifying factor"- the
heterogeneity constraint-beneted farmers on average. As we shall see, the reason for this surprising
outcome is that in this context, there is an unusual alignment of interests between farmer Fd and the
other two farmers. It actually helps farmers further upstream to be able to assign high quotas to Fd.
As the heterogeneity constraint tightens, their exibility to do this is curtailed, and their bargaining
strength is weakened.
The phenomenon just described does not arise in the nal round of bargaining. As Figure 9 illustrates,
the drought eect tightens both the budget and the hydraulic constraints. To cover the budget con-






















































































































Figure 8: Farmer proposals: CPIQ, normal conditions, nal round: Ds is default strong
straint, farmers Fu and Fm have to choose, on the margin, between either raising the common price or
increasing the total amount of distributed quotas (without hitting one of the three hydraulic constraints).
In the latter option, the easiest is to allocate more quotas to Fd whose use of quotas has a smaller impact
on residual ows. Under these conditions, both farmers prefer to give up their own quotas and hand
them to Fd than raise prices. That is, the position of Fd downstream of the river and faced with a less
tight hydraulic constraint, provides the group with a positive externality: he can be given more quotas
without requiring more dam capacity and he can therefore contribute to the budget without increasing
the common price. However, as the heterogeneity constraint is tightened, the value of this externality is
reduced and the utility of the farmer coalition, on average, declines.
In conclusion,
In contrast to the role of the spokesman, tightening the heterogeneity constraint to force farmers to align
their proposals actually benets Fu. The spokesman's objective is to obtain the most ecient allocation
of quotas for the farmer coalition as a whole: he therefore sacrices the farmer who is the most useful
for fullling the constraints. In the heterogeneity experiment, in contrast, farmers remain primarily
concerned with individual gain. However, by being forced to align their proposals, they have to make
better oers to their fellow farmers. They therefore indirectly strengthen the farmer coalition as a whole
except in the case when the exploitation of their dierence yielded more benets than the elimination of
the beggar-thy-neighbor behavior.








































































































Figure 9: Farmer proposals: CPIQ, drought, penultimate round: Ds is default strong
5 CONCLUSION
We have explored the interactions between the structure of the bargaining process, and the eective power
of bargaining participants. Overall, our results indicate that the structure of the negotiation process is
an important determinant of negotiation outcomes. For participants, there are a number of sources of
bargaining power. The two direct sources are access, modeled as the probability of being chosen to make a
proposal, and default strength, or how well the participant will fare if the negotiation does not result in an
agreement. Our analysis has identied a number of other sources of power. First, our examination of how
farmers fared depending on the allocation of access showed that giving up access in favor of a stronger ally
could increase one's ability to inuence the negotiation outcome to one's own advantage. Our experiment
regarding the appointment of a common spokesman for farmers showed that the welfare of farmers as
a whole increases with the use of a spokesman; however, it also suggests that side payments may be
required for the participants to implement such a solution. Alternatively, such considerations may be
included ex ante when dening who may participate in a negotiation process. Essentially, the spokesman
improves average farmer welfare because he does not engage in "beggar-thy-neighbor" behavior when
making a proposal. Our experiment regarding the maximum degree of heterogeneity allowed in the policy
variables for the three farmers showed that restrictions on the bargaining space usually aects positively
the welfare of farmers. However, allies can sometimes gain collectively by exploiting their dierences
rather than by aligning their positions. The homogeneity strategy can therefore be detrimental. The
general conclusion is that sources of bargaining power are very diverse and are sometimes not easily
anticipated. It therefore hints that pre-negotiation bargains may be necessary to dene collectively the
structure of the negotiation.
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NOTE
In our multi-issue bargaining model, it is necessary to distinguish between rst-order and second-order
preferences. At a rst-order level, each negotiator has dierent concerns, and each is indierent to some
issue that matters a great deal to another negotiator. For example, each farmer group is concerned
about the price and quota level that applies to its own sub-basin, and is, to a rst-order approximation,
indierent between alternative allocations of quotas and prices to the other two sub-basins. Similarly,
the environmentalist is unconcerned about the cost to farmers of acquiring quotas. In the context of
our model, in which each party makes a proposal that aects all parties, this state of aairs is entirely
unsatisfactory: allocations that have a signicant impact on some parties may be determined by arbitrary
resolutions of indierence by others. To address this problem we are obliged to specify "second-order
preferences" for each agent. For example, we assume that at a second-order level, farmers in one sub-
basin prefer equal to unequal distributions of benets and costs among the farmers in other sub-basins.
To implement the idea of second-order preferences, we add to each agent's rst-order utility function a
second utility function that is weighted by an extremely small coecient. When a second-order preference
involves maximizing a gain, we specify it as a Cobb-Douglas. When it involves minimizing a loss, we
specify it as a quadratic. Other things equal, these specications ensure that agents choose a balanced
bundle.
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